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the subject of the information but by a variety of independ-
ent information providers, including search engines, ratings
and review sites, and price-comparison sites. Information is
often the ultimate product of such information providers,
rather than advertising for other products, so it is not a good
match for consumer protection laws directed at advertising. 
Although such information can be skewed in various ways,
the skewed information would not necessarily be false or mis-
leading so as to make it subject to consumer protection law.
For example, a search engine that in its search results down-
graded a potential search competitor or favored its own relat-
ed products over others’ products would not necessarily be
providing “misleading” results, at least if there is no require-
ment of even-handness.4 And the same would be true for a
review site that refused to display positive reviews for sellers
that did not buy advertising on the site, or for a price-com-
parison site that displayed prices only for sellers that paid to
be included.5 Instead, the information in these instances
would better be characterized simply as of low quality, just as
are some tangible goods that are nevertheless not so danger-
ous as to make them subject to product liability law.
Admittedly, applying antitrust law to this sort of market
information presents some novel issues. For the most part,
although antitrust law has been applied to many information
products—such as movies, ebooks, patented technology,
etc.—it has not typically been applied to information about
other products. But in some cases the Supreme Court has
emphasized harm to information markets. Two examples are
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 6 and
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,7 where the Court con-
demned “effort[s] to withhold (or make more costly) infor-
mation desired by consumers for the purpose of determining
whether a particular purchase is cost justified.”8 Moreover, in
Indiana Federation of Dentists it said that “even if the desired
information were in fact completely useless . . . the Federation
would still not be justified in deciding on behalf of its mem-
bers’ customers that they did not need the information.”9
It is true that these cases involved collusion, not exclusion,
and the power of information may be more apparent in that
context. But the point is that the effect of the collusion was
on demand, not on supply (except supply of information),
and the Court applied antitrust law. Applying antitrust law
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MARK E T  I N F O R M A T I O Ndelivered by Google, Amazon, Yelp, andsimilar online platforms has become asimportant for consumer decision-makingas advertising. Indeed, studies show that
many consumers rely increasingly on online sources of infor-
mation, despite concerns about possible manipulation and
bias in that information.1 This suggests that competition
law, broadly understood, has a role to play in regulation of
online information platforms. But what role? Some com-
mentators argue that the effect of information on demand is
the domain of consumer protection law.2 However, some
problems of online information markets, particularly those
that cannot easily be characterized as deception, are better
addressed by antitrust law.3
Consumer protection law is an informational analog of
product liability law. Both regulate particular harms that
low-quality products can cause: deception in the case of con-
sumer protection and physical harm in the case of product
liability. But product liability law is not the only legal con-
straint that helps to determine the quality of tangible prod-
ucts. On the contrary, it serves only to deter marketing of 
the most defective products, leaving to competition and to
antitrust the task of ensuring that within the remaining range
of possible products producers deliver the ones consumers
want. Analogously, consumer protection law should not be
the sole legal constraint on the delivery of market informa-
tion. Deception is not the only informational harm that can
injure competition, and when information goods are pro-
vided in markets distorted by collusion or exclusion, antitrust
law should be applicable as well. 
In this respect, the information economy presents new
problems. Some types of online market information, such as
search results and product reviews, are provided in what are
best viewed as markets for information. Furthermore, the
information is provided not by sellers of the products that are
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where an information provider has market power is arguably
consistent with the Areeda antitrust treatise, too. As will be
discussed further below, the treatise would apply antitrust to
misrepresentations only where they are “not readily suscep-
tible of neutralization or other offset by rivals.”10 That crite-
rion suggests looking to barriers to entry in the information
market and thus makes informational power a key element.
In choosing between antitrust and consumer protection we
should ask not whether information is involved, but whether
the relevant information problem is market power or decep-
tion. It is informational market power that is becoming
increasingly important. 
The Evolution of Information Distribution
Much of the evolution of markets over the last century, at least
for individual consumers, has been in product distribution.
Specifically, much of product distribution has moved down-
stream from manufacturers to independent dealers. In the
20th century this transition generally took place in the con-
text of the distribution of physical products. Independent
dealers, not manufacturers, became the primary source from
which consumers purchased goods. Dealers also promoted the
goods and provided information about them, but for the
most part did so as part of the distribution chain for the
goods themselves. In the 21st century, however, the informa-
tional role has become increasingly decoupled from physical
distribution. Providers like Google, Yelp, and Expedia provide
information but not the actual products themselves.
The 20th-century changes in product distribution required
parallel changes in the law. Both product liability law and
antitrust responded to the presence of intermediary dealers
between manufacturers and consumers. Product liability law
made dealers strictly liable for defects in products that they
sold but did not manufacture, and antitrust shifted much of
its emphasis from horizontal production issues to vertical dis-
tribution ones. As suggested earlier, the two bodies of law are
complementary, with product liability law providing com-
pensation for defective products and antitrust ensuring com-
petition on product quality within the range of products that
fall outside the limits of tort. 
Now distribution has changed again with the rise of Inter -
net information intermediaries like Google and Yelp. These
firms play key roles in product competition, but not neces-
sarily through distribution of physical products. Instead, they
provide information that can determine which products con-
sumers will buy. In some instances, as in the case of Amazon,
these Internet firms also deliver products, but even there the
delivery of information like reviews and recommendations
may be as important as is physical distribution.11 Thus, just
as the primary forum of competition moved first from man-
ufacturing to distribution by independent dealers that pro-
vided both physical distribution and associated promotion-
al activities, it has moved now to delivery of information by
independent online platforms.
And just as product liability adapted to changes in phys-
ical distribution, consumer protection law has responded to
changes in information delivery, with the FTC revising its
endorsement guidelines and issuing guidelines for “dot com”
disclosures and native advertising.12 Those initiatives, how-
ever, do not fully address recent changes in information mar-
kets. To address problems like distorted search results or
selective inclusion of reviews on review sites or pay-to-play on
price-comparison sites,13 more is needed. Those problems
go beyond the deception of individual consumers to impli-
cate market competition in the delivery of information, so
antitrust law is the most relevant body of law.14
Antitrust and Information Markets
Courts have often been reluctant to apply antitrust to infor-
mation issues, however. Several months ago the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton
Dickinson & Co.15 rejected an antitrust claim based on false
advertising, relying on a peculiar rationale: “[F]alse advertis-
ing alone hardly ever operates in practice to threaten com-
petition. . . . [F]alse advertising simply sets the stage for com-
petition in a different venue: the advertising market.”16 The
rationale is peculiar because one would not expect competi-
tion in an advertising market to make antitrust inapplicable.
If an advertising market is a market, one would expect
antitrust to apply in that market. 
In declining to apply antitrust to advertising information,
the Retractable Technologies court relied on cases from the
Seventh Circuit, which has held that absent coercion “even
demonstrably false [c]ommercial speech is not actionable
under the anti trust laws.”17 Those Seventh Circuit cases, in
turn, relied on the claim that information is not a restraint.
For example, in one of those cases the court said that unilat-
eral commercial speech does not violate the antitrust laws
unless it “is accompanied by some sort of ‘enforcement mech-
anism’ designed somehow to coerce or compel that competi-
tor to heed the admonition.”18
This reference to enforcement mechanisms arguably mis-
represents at least some of the decisions to which the Seventh
Circuit pointed,19 such as American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.20 The information at issue
in ASME was an “unofficial” letter on the ASME’s stationery
criticizing a competitor’s product, and the Court did not
In choosing between antitrust and consumer 
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rely, at least explicitly, on any enforcement mechanism. In
fact, the Court said the letter was used “to discourage cus-
tomers from buying Hydrolevel’s product,” and that the com-
petitor involved “instructed its salesmen to tell potential cus-
tomers that Hydrolevel’s fuel cutoff failed to satisfy ASME’s
[standard].”21 Other cases cited by the Seventh Circuit also
involved little in the way of “enforcement” or “coercion.”22
Thus, the hostility of some courts to information claims
is not obviously shared by the Supreme Court. Of course,
that information claims should not be summarily rejected by
antitrust does not mean that many of them, or many types
of them, should prevail. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp
say that “[a] monopolist’s misrepresentations encouraging
the purchase of its product can fit our general test for an
exclusionary practice when the impact on rivals is signifi-
cant.”23 But they also say that “[b]ecause the likelihood of a
significant creation of durable market power is so small in
most observed instances—and because the prevalence of
arguably improper utterance is so great—the courts would
be wise to regard misrepresentations as presumptively de
minimis for § 2 purposes.”24
When, then, would that presumption be overcome? A 
suggestion can be found in Maurice Stucke’s comment,
responding to Areeda and Hovenkamp, that “[i]f product
dispar agement is ineffectual, why would any firm, much less
a mon opolist, engage in it?”25 A possible response is that
informational conduct might be effective in a variety of ways.
Mis representations and product disparagement can be effec-
tive, but, as Areeda and Hovenkamp indicate, they are unlike-
ly to create market power, so they should be “presumptively
de minimis for § 2 purposes.” That is, they might be effective,
but not through injury to market competition.26 That inter-
pretation is supported by one of the elements that Areeda and
Hovenkamp demand to overcome the de minimis presump-
tion: that the harmful information is “not readily susceptible
of neutralization or other offset by rivals.”27 That can be inter-
preted as calling for some sort of barrier to entry in the infor-
mation market, and hence a market-oriented, antitrust-based
approach.
Antitrust and Information Platforms
Thus, antitrust should apply to information problems when
those can be shown to be market problems. In fact, there were
antitrust cases that involved information “platforms” even
before online delivery of information became important. 
In Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co.,28 for
example, a dominant local newspaper refused to allow a com-
peting provider of apartment rental advertising to advertise
in the newspaper’s classified pages. The appeals court reversed
a judgment for the defendant newspaper, holding that “the
Journal was using its dominance in the newspaper advertis-
ing market to foreclose competition in the housing vacancy
information market.”29
Home Placement involved a refusal to deal, which makes it
arguably similar, for example, to the basic theory of the
European Commission’s case against Google. The EC’s state-
ment of objections “alleges that Google treats and has treat-
ed more favourably, in its general search results pages, Google’s
own comparison shopping service ‘Google Shopping’ . . .
compared to rival comparison shopping services.”30 Alterna -
tively, a platform’s treatment of certain sites more or less
favorably could be viewed as a skewing of information, not a
refusal to deliver it. Whichever perspective one adopts, the fol-
lowing paragraphs describe how such information-based
claims could be approached under Sherman Act Section 2 or
Article 102 TFEU. The focus here is primarily on power,
which distinguishes antitrust enforcement in these cases from
consumer protection, but some comments are also offered
regarding anticompetitive informational conduct. 
Power. For tangible goods and services, market share
often accurately reflects the ability of a firm to act without
regard to competition. If a firm with a large market share
seeks to act anticompetitively—by raising price, for exam-
ple—smaller competitors may be unable to respond—by
selling at a lower price—if they are too small to produce the
unmet demand. For information, though, an expansion of
capacity often requires only the delivery of more “copies” of
information that have already been produced by development
of a search algorithm or the accumulation of user reviews.
Online platforms, for example, may need only to expand
server capacity or bandwidth, neither of which is likely to
require expenditures or time on a scale comparable to that
required with tangible goods or services. 
The focus in evaluating informational power, then,
should be on the particular market barriers that could pre-
vent competitors from responding to a dominant firm’s pro-
vision of low-quality information. One important barrier is
the difficulty of distinguishing high-quality and low-quali-
ty information. It is not far wrong to say that whenever a
consumer is seeking purchasing information, she is likely to
find it difficult to evaluate the quality of the information she
receives. Competitors, too, will often find it difficult to cor-
rect low-quality information provided to consumers. The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized a similar problem in East man
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.31 There the infor-
mation at issue concerned the repair costs of Kodak copiers
and similar products, and the Court pointed out the diffi-
culty and expense for consumers of obtaining that informa-
tion. Furthermore, it noted that even “[a] competitor in the
equipment market may not have reliable information about
the lifecycle costs of complex equipment it does not service
or the needs of customers it does not serve.”32
In the same way, information from online platforms may
be difficult or costly for consumers and for competitors to
evaluate. There is probably little problem with price infor-
mation, where at least competitors presumably would easily
be able to tell whether platforms are displaying the best
prices. Quality information, though, is more problematic.
Could TripAdvisor or another Yelp competitor determine
whether Yelp included all relevant reviews? And could Bing
where the defendant newspaper refused to allow a competing
provider of apartment rental advertising to advertise in its
classified pages, the court focused on the importance of
advertising in the newspaper:
Thus, the relevant product is not all advertising, or even all
classified advertising, but merely daily newspaper rental
advertising. Defendant offered no rebuttal of plaintiff’s sub-
stantial evidence, through numerous witnesses, that there
was no effective substitute therefor. . . . In short, on the evi-
dence, none of the alternative media identified by the court
could be said to be “reasonably interchangeable” with, or
competing “on substantial parity” with, the rental columns
of daily newspapers.35
Online platforms pose similar but more severe problems.
In Home Placement Service, the ultimate purchase was not
made through the Providence Journal; rental agencies simply
used the newspaper to attract customers, as with traditional
advertising. Therefore, there were presumably other avenues
(though the court found them unsatisfactory) for reaching
consumers. For online platforms, though, the purchasing
decision is often made while the consumer is on the platform.
A consumer might make a purchase on Amazon, or determine
which restaurant to patronize from Yelp, or click straight to a
seller’s page from Google. The platforms do not just offer
advertising—they create platform-based markets, and com-
petitors’ ability to reach consumers outside those markets
may be of little value.
Additionally, sellers denied equal access to platforms might
find it difficult to match the apparent objectivity of the plat-
forms. Consumers of information may view information
from platforms like Google and Yelp differently, and less
skeptically, than they view advertising from the seller of a
product. The apparent independence of online platforms
may lead consumers to think that the information they are
receiving is more objective than it is. As New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman said in announcing his office’s
crackdown on providers of false reviews on online platforms,
“What we’ve found is even worse than old-fashioned false
advertising. . . . When you look at a billboard, you can tell
it’s a paid advertisement—but on Yelp or Citysearch, you
assume you’re reading authentic consumer opinions, making
this practice even more deceiving.”36
This is a potential problem not just for sellers of products
that receive false bad reviews on Yelp or are placed lower in
Google’s search results than their competitors, but also for
direct competitors of Google, such as Bing. Suppose that
Bing sought to persuade consumers that Google ranked cer-
tain sites too high or too low in its search results. Aside from
the difficulty of assessing the contentions as a factual matter,
a consumer would have to consider what weight to place on
the different context in which Bing provided the information.
It would be clear that Bing was providing the information for
competitive purposes, but Google search results likely would
not be seen so clearly, if at all, as an effort to gain a compet-
itive advantage. 
or another search engine determine whether Google’s omis-
sion of certain sites from its search results is justified because
those sites are not valuable? Algorithmic secrecy and the con-
sumer-specific nature of information exacerbate these prob-
lems.33 As a result, the relevant barrier to entry in the infor-
mation market may not be the inability to deliver sufficient
quantities of information, but the difficulty of showing con-
sumers that the information offered is better than alternatives. 
This difficulty is in fact used by some commentators to
argue that it is inappropriate to apply antitrust to these
information providers. For example, Geoffrey Manne and
Joshua Wright say that “[r]elevance is a slippery and subjec-
tive concept, different for every user and every query, and
there is no a priori way to define it; as with pro- and anti-
competitive conduct, it can be nearly impossible to differ-
entiate between ‘relevant’ and ‘manipulated’ results.”34
Manne and Wright make this point in arguing that it is dif-
ficult to determine what is anticompetitive conduct in this
context, but another implication is that conduct that is in
fact anticompetitive (however defined) is less likely to be
identified and countered.
A second barrier to competition is that of access to con-
sumers when it matters. If a consumer is using Google and
the consumer is delivered a search result that is of low qual-
ity, how is Bing to obtain access to the consumer to show it
an alternative result? One might ask how this is different
from the bricks-and-mortar world, in which a consumer at
one store will not be easily accessible to other stores. There are
two important differences, however. First, a consumer at a
store knows that he or she is seeing only that store’s offerings.
The consumer is therefore on notice that he or she has
incomplete information, in a way that a user of a search
engine or price-comparison site that purports or is assumed
to display the best options may not be. Second, a consumer
in a store will generally be presented with the same products,
at the same prices, as are presented to other consumers. That
is, there will generally be no customization of the kind that
is possible online.
To some extent, this situation echoes cases in which one
information provider, like a newspaper or magazine, has
refused to allow competitors to advertise in its pages. In the
Home Placement Service case referred to above, for example,
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The focus in evaluating informational power, then,
should be on the par t icular market barr iers that could
prevent competitors from responding to a dominant
f i rm’s provision of low-qual ity information. One 
impor tant bar r ier is the dif f iculty of dist inguishing
high-qual ity and low-qual ity information. 
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A variation on this problem was present in one of the few
deception cases in antitrust, American Professional Testing Ser -
vice, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Professional
Pub lications, Inc.37 Harcourt distributed anonymous fliers
suggesting that its competitor, American, was the subject of
an SEC investigation and might be involved in a bankrupt-
cy investigation.38 In fact, American was not being investi-
gated by the SEC, nor was it accused of violations. Yet it is
unlikely that American could have persuaded the SEC to
issue a denial, and the anonymity of the statements would
have made them more difficult to refute because any response
from American could have been seen as self-interested. Plat -
forms are not anonymous, of course, but to the extent that
they are viewed as objective, they acquire even more infor-
mational power.
To be sure, platforms that deliver low-quality information
risk reputational harm. But there is evidence that reputation
is not always an effective constraint on information pro -
viders,39 in part because of the informational constraints just
discussed. Reputation is particularly problematic for search
engines. Many searches that a consumer performs on a search
engine are for information that a search engine would have
no incentive to distort. It is likely only searches related to pos-
sible purchases for which there would be such an incentive.
Therefore, the experience of consumers is that Google and
other search engines deliver exactly the information they
want the great majority of the time, so the search engines
could establish reputations based on these non-commercial
searches and exploit that reputation in commercial ones. 
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller describe a similar sort
of “reputation mining” in their book Phishing for Phools.40
Their discussion is of credit-rating agencies mining their pre-
viously established reputations for trustworthiness to suc-
cessfully market low-quality information in the form of inac-
curate credit ratings. In the search engine example, the idea
would be one of mining a reputation for trustworthiness
established in non-commercial searches to market low-qual-
ity information in commercial searches. To detect the differ-
ence in quality, consumers would have to be quite sophisti-
cated in how they evaluated the different search results they
received.
Exclusion. The exclusionary effect of a platform’s provi-
sion of low-quality information would depend on how
important the information on a platform is. There have been
a number of allegations that Google has engaged in a variety
of forms of search bias. Some of these have been made in
antitrust suits, though no such suit in the United States has
survived a motion to dismiss. More recently, economists and
business journalists have conducted studies that appear to
confirm such bias, at least in certain contexts.41 Yelp, too, has
been alleged to have used its power unfairly, by threatening
removal of positive ratings for sellers that do not purchase
advertising.42
This is not the place to evaluate these allegations in detail,
and in any event the legitimacy of the platforms’ justifications,
discussed below, may be more important. But the reliance 
of consumers on information platforms indicates that the
practices alleged could cause significant competitive harm. In
this respect, the FTC noted in closing its investigation into
Google’s search bias that Google’s algorithm changes “result-
ed in significant traffic loss to the demoted comparison shop-
ping properties, arguably weakening those websites as rivals
to Google’s own shopping.”43 The magnitude of this harm
may be difficult to quantify, but it would turn on the extent
to which consumers rely on those sites. Here the platform’s
share is indeed important because it is a determinant of the
portion of the information market (and, possibly, the prod-
uct market) from which competitors are foreclosed.
An important aspect of some platform cases is that the
platform might not itself be a competitor of the firms injured.
Although some of the plaintiffs in cases against Google have
been competing “vertical” search engines, and other firms sell
products in competition with Google affiliates, some firms
potentially injured by Yelp and Google are not themselves
competitors of the platforms. There is, therefore, a causation
issue here that requires a determination of whether exclusion
from the information market causes harm in the underlying
product market in a sufficiently direct and significant way.44
Alternatively, such harm could be viewed as a harm directly
in the information market, given that a firm’s advertising is
lessened in value by the information platform.45
Legitimate Business Purpose. The FTC (unlike the
EC) terminated its Google investigation without taking
action, but not because there was no exclusionary harm.
Instead, it accepted that Google might have had a legitimate
business justification for its conduct.46 The justification gen-
erally offered by Google is that sites rank lower in search
results not for competitive reasons but because the sites fall
short in some way. There is unlikely to be a way to assess this
justification from an external perspective. The most likely
way in which a platform’s justification could be rebutted
would be internal evidence that it was making decisions
regarding which results to display based specifically on com-
petitive advantage. In such an instance, a platform’s conduct
would seem to lack a legitimate purpose because it would be
choosing conduct other than that which would make its prod-
uct more useful and attractive to consumers.47
One might think that this approach would be difficult to
implement. Perhaps Google (or another platform) could sim-
ply find a proxy for its commercial interests, and use that in
its search algorithm. For example, because most of the alle-
gations against Google have been brought by vertical search
engines, perhaps Google could claim that vertical search
engines are downgraded in its results not to gain a competi-
tive advantage but because searchers do not find vertical
search engines to be useful. But antitrust law has considerable
experience evaluating justifications to determine if they are
pretextual. Google or another platform would presumably
have to justify any algorithmic factors by reference to actual
evidence of consumer preferences.48 The goal would not be to
interfere with Google’s, or any other platform’s “editorial”
discretion but to determine whether it is truly editorial dis-
cretion or competitive advantage that is behind its decisions.
Importantly, the evaluation of such justifications could be
both easier and more difficult than in more typical, non-
informational cases. It would be easier to the extent that the
platform’s algorithms, or ad hoc exceptions to them, could
reveal specific efforts to exclude. It would be more difficult,
however, in that any exclusion would take place not in the
real world, where it might be easier to detect, but within the
decision-making systems of the platform. In other words, it
might be more difficult to make out a prima facie claim of
exclusion without discovery, but it might be easier, with dis-
covery, to determine the validity of procompetitive justifica-
tions. That makes the dismissal of cases against platforms
before discovery even more problematic. The difficulty here
is described by Frank Pasquale in his recent book The Black
Box Society,49 where he compellingly describes the extent to
which we are dependent, in search and other contexts, on
firms’ internal algorithmic results and decisions. As he says,
“Antitrust law flirts with irrelevance if it disdains the tech-
nical tools necessary to understand a modern information
economy.”50
Conclusion
Online information platforms present important founda-
tional questions for antitrust law. Does the development of
such a platform, and its acquisition of power, create an obli-
gation to act in an even-handed way? Antitrust and other
claims against platforms have generally failed in the United
States, often on grounds that the plaintiff has failed to ade-
quately define a market or show sufficient power or that the
platforms are free to grant or deny their services as they like.51
Some claims against platforms no doubt should be rejected,
but it is also the case that antitrust lacks a well-developed
approach to information power and competition. Yet, in a
very real sense the forum for competition has moved from the
delivery of products to the delivery of information about
them. Therefore, if antitrust is to serve its purpose of ensur-
ing effective competition, it must be adapted to apply to
online platforms and other information providers. 
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